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Abstract According to standard theories of VP-ellipsis, possible readings are
determined by constraints (syntactic, semantic, discoursal) that apply jointly to the
antecedent and ellipsis clauses. Drawing on insights from a number of previous
authors, I present two arguments for a model in which VP-ellipsis meanings are
crucially dependent on the operative (and often implicitly resolved) question-under-
discussion (QUD) (Roberts 1998/2012), specifically requiring that the meaning of
an ellipsis clause be a member of the QUD’s alternative set.
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1 Introduction
Sentence (1) is an example of verb phrase (VP) ellipsis in English:
(1) John read his paper, and Bill did too. [read his paper]
The stranded auxiliary in the second clause (henceforth referred to as the ELLIPSIS
CLAUSE) marks a vestigial verb phrase, a meaning for which must be identified from
context. This meaning is typically derived from the occurrence of another linguistic
expression (the ANTECEDENT), in this case the first clause.
It is well-known that under certain conditions, an antecedent clause that contains
a pronoun may license more than one possible meaning for an ellipsis clause. For
instance, assuming that the assignment of the pronoun his in the antecedent clause of
(1) leads to the reading under which John read John’s paper, two possible meanings
become available for the ellipsis clause: one in which Bill read John’s paper (the
STRICT reading), and one in which Bill read his own paper (the SLOPPY reading).
Despite the considerable attention paid to VP-ellipsis in the literature over the
past four decades, the conditions that determine the space of possible strict and sloppy
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interpretations are still not well understood. In what I will refer to as STANDARD
ANALYSES, the space of meanings are determined by constraints that enforce some
type of parallelism between the antecedent and ellipsis clauses. In early standard
analyses (Keenan 1971; Sag 1976; Williams 1977), this parallelism was achieved
by an identity condition on VP representations that assumed that pronouns were
inherently ambiguous between referential and bound interpretations:
(2) a. John j read his j paper, and Billb did read his j paper too.
b. John β1 read his1 paper, and Bill did β1 read his1 paper too.1
If the pronoun his is coreferential with John as in (1a), the identity condition yields
the strict reading for the ellipsis clause. Alternatively, if it receives a bound interpre-
tation as in (1b), the sloppy reading results.
Despite its intuitive appeal, it has become clear that the ambiguity treatment
suffers from a number of seemingly insuperable problems. For instance, sloppy
readings are licensed within more extended parallelism domains, as in (3).
(3) John β1 told a man that Mary likes him1, and Bill β2 told a boy that Susan
does like him2. (Prüst 1992)
In light of the intervening material between the subject and ellipsis site, there is no
possibility for the long distance binding necessary to derive the sloppy reading.
A second problem is created by what Dalrymple, Shieber & Pereira (1991) term
CASCADED ELLIPSIS (Dahl 1972; Schiebe 1973):
(4) John realizes that he is a fool, but Bill does not, even though his wife does.
An acceptable, and perhaps preferred, reading for (4) is:
(5) John realizes that John is a fool, Bill does not realize that Bill is a fool, even
though Bill’s wife realizes Bill is a fool.
Example (4) contains two ellipses; the reading in (5) results from the second clause
receiving a sloppy interpretation from the first and the third clause receiving a strict
interpretation from the second. The ambiguity treatment specifically predicts that
reading (5) should not exist, since the second clause only has the bound variable VP
received from the first, and hence the referential VP that the third clause requires
from the second to license the strict reading is not present.
Finally, strict and sloppy readings can result even when there is no possibility
for a referential interpretation in the antecedent clause (Dahl 1972; Schiebe 1973):
1 For present purposes I will assume an analysis in which elision occurs at a level of syntactic Logical
Form, although other implementations are possible. Binding relations are represented using the
semantic binding system described in Büring 2005.
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(6) Every department chair thinks that he will need to buy supplies for his office,
and that the dean will too.
Example (6) has readings that correspond to the strict/sloppy distinction: the dean
may need to buy supplies for the chair’s office or her own. However, because
the pronoun his can only be bound in the antecedent, there is no possibility for a
referential interpretation.
Due to these and other problematic cases, researchers have pursued ‘extended’
standard analyses that do not assume ambiguity in the antecedent representation,
but instead rely on parallelism conditions or special machinery of various sorts
(Dalrymple et al. 1991; Prüst 1992; Hobbs & Kehler 1997; Fox 2000; Asher, Hardt
& Busquets 2001; inter alia). An oft-cited example of the first type is from Fox
(2000), who posits the following constraint:
(7) NP Parallelism
NPs in the antecedent and elided VPs must either
a. have the same referential value (Referential Parallelism) or
b. be linked by identical dependencies (Structural Parallelism)
The problem is that such conditions and/or machinery are stipulative: They do not
follow from other properties of the grammar, as Fox himself notes for his analysis.2
This is unfortunate, as one would like to think of the ability to elide a VP as being
a natural consequence of independently existing constraints and processes, rather
than the result of a specialized linguistic construction associated with its own form-
specific principles and machinery. For example, one would prefer an explanation
that appeals to the interaction of the grammar with discourse phenomena (e.g.,
information structure, coherence establishment) that we already know to operate
independently of ellipsis.
This paper is intended to provide a step in this direction, specifically by claiming
that the space of available VP-ellipsis readings is crucially dependent on the op-
erative (and often implicitly resolved) question-under-discussion (QUD) (Roberts
1998/2012). Specifically, adopting insights from Rooth (1992), I pursue an analysis
in which a verb phrase VPE can be elided only if the meaning of the ellipsis clause
CE is congruent with the QUD — i.e., [[QUD]]g = ||CE ||g — assuming no focus-
marking on or within VPE .3 When the QUD is implicit, as it is in many cases, it is
accommodated based on the antecedent and ellipsis clauses in a manner specified in
Section 4.
The idea of employing QUDs to explain VP-ellipsis phenomena is not new.
They have been appealed to either directly or indirectly in analyses of missing
2 They tend to have problems as well, e.g., Fox’s version also won’t work for cases like (6).
3 I use brackets ([[]]) to denote ordinary semantic values and bars (||||) to denote focus semantic values.
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readings puzzles (Kehler & Büring 2007), examples with sloppy readings despite
the lack of a C-command relation (Keshet 2013), the conditions under which syn-
tactically mismatched antecedents are acceptable (Kertz 2008, 2013; Grant, Clifton
& Frazier 2012), so-called ‘sticky’ interpretations (Elliott, Nicolae & Sudo 2014),
exophorically-resolved cases (Miller & Pullum 2014), and cases with nominalized
antecedents (Miller & Hemforth 2015).4 In this paper I add additional arguments for
the claim by way of two examples. The first argument appeals to an example that
appears to have a sloppy reading even though standard theories predict it to not be
available. The second appeals to an example that lacks a sloppy reading even though
standard theories predict it to be available.
2 QUDs: The idea
According to the QUD approach (I take Roberts 1998/2012 as an exemplar), dis-
courses obtain their coherence through a hierarchical structure of question-answer
relationships. Following Stalnaker (1979), discourse is viewed as an attempt by con-
versational participants to share “the way things are” (or in QUD terms, answer the
question “What is the way things are?”). The interlocutors’ joint adoption of the goal
of answering this question will necessitate the adoption and satisfaction of subgoals
centered on answering subquestions, giving rise to a hierarchical discourse structure
(the STRATEGY OF INQUIRY). Understanding a discourse therefore requires that
interlocutors not only understand the particular utterances in the discourse, but also
identify the questions they answer, and situate those questions in the underlying
strategy of inquiry in light of their conversational goals.
Let us step through a couple of simple examples. Suppose I uttered (8a-b) to my
wife Jill a few days before the SALT conference:
(8) a. I need to work tonight.
b. I’m presenting a talk at SALT later this week.
Jill is unlikely to assume that I’m merely sharing two facts about myself. Instead,
she’ll try to recover what question (8b) answers with respect to (8a), with world
knowledge and inference suggesting that the answer is Why?. The accommodation
of this QUD will lead to pragmatic enrichments — e.g., that my intention was to
work on my SALT talk that evening — which go beyond what I actually said.
In other cases, an inferred QUD might sit on top of several utterances rather than
intervene between them. Consider (9a-b):
(9) a. Andy worked on his SALT talk this evening.
4 QUDs have also been utilized in analyses of other types of ellipsis as well, such as fragment answers
(Reich 2007; Weir 2014) and sluicing (Ginzburg & Sag 2000; Ginzburg 2012; AnderBois 2014).
515
Kehler
b. Jill answered her email.
Here, (9a-b) gain their coherence by understanding each to provide a partial answer
to a common QUD, e.g., Who did what this evening?. With that background, we are
ready to consider our first key example.
3 An unexpectedly available ‘sloppy’ interpretation
3.1 The example
The first argument is based on an example due to Hardt (1992a,b, 1999):
(10) Every boy in John’s class hoped Mrs. Smith would pass him. In John’s j case,
I think she WILL pass him j. (variant of Hardt 1999, ex. 8)
The ellipsis clause in (10) appears to admit of a sloppy interpretation — I think
she will pass John — despite the fact that the example lacks the type of syntactic
or semantic parallelism between the clauses that almost all theories require. In
particular, the anaphoric relationship in the ellipsis clause does not mirror the binding
configuration between the pronoun and quantified noun phrase in the antecedent.
While this example presents a clear adequacy criterion for any theory of strict and
sloppy interpretations in VP-ellipsis, discussion of such examples is conspicuously
lacking in the literature.
The apparent rebinding of the pronoun him to John in the ellipsis clause led
Hardt to conclude that pronouns within elided material are not subject to parallelism
conditions of the Sag/Williams variety, but instead reinterpreted freely in the ellipsis
site using the same discourse principles that apply to overt pronouns. In (10), for
instance, the semantic representation of the VP pass him would be copied to the
ellipsis clause representation with the pronoun unresolved. With John being in a
presumably salient position within the ellipsis clause, ordinary pronoun interpretation
mechanisms then resolve him to John, on analogy with the unelided version in (11).
(11) Every boy in John’s class hoped she would pass him. In John’s case, I think
she will pass him.
Kehler & Shieber (1997) subsequently argued against Hardt’s analysis, claiming
that it can only be maintained if it is assumed that the VPs in the unelided versions
must be fully deaccented. They considered minimal pairs such as (12a-b).
(12) a. # Every boy in Mrs. Smith’s class hoped she would pass him. Last night at
John j’s party, however, I predicted that she won’t pass him j.
b. Every boy in Mrs. Smith’s class hoped she would pass him. Last night at
John j’s party, however, I predicted that she won’t pass him j.
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The reading where the speaker predicted that Mrs. Smith won’t pass John, while
available (12b), is not in its elided counterpart (12a).
So if we evaluate Hardt’s analysis as stated, the contrast between (12a) and (12b)
provides a counterexample. However, there’s a rub: Accent appears to be required
within the VP of (12b), in this case on the pronoun. Indeed, this is expected on stan-
dard theories of focus marking and accent placement; whereas both the verb meaning
(pass) and the object NP meaning (John) represent Given information, the result
of combining the two (passed John) does not. On theories such as Schwarzschild
(1999), inter alia, the VP will therefore require F-marking, which in turn requires
that either the verb or object pronoun receive accent. As shown by example (13), in
such cases accent will typically fall on the pronoun:
(13) John passed Bob, and Sue

passed JOHN.
# PASSED John.
# passed John.

Hardt’s analysis can thus be maintained under the assumption that only deaccented
VPs can be elided, since, by their nature, elided VPs cannot carry accent. In that
case, however, all we have done is reduce the problem of identifying what Given
predicates license VP ellipsis to a similar problem, namely, what Given predicates
license deaccentuation (Tancredi 1992; Rooth 1992; inter alia); in either scenario we
would expect pronoun interpretation to be more restricted than in the general case.5
So then the real mystery is why the VP can be deaccented in the unelided version of
(10), shown in (11), but not in the unelided version of (12b), i.e., (12a).
3.2 The solution
So what’s the solution to our mystery? I claim that prepositional phrases such as
In X’s case (and related ones, such as As for X and Regarding X) are markers of a
CONTRASTIVE TOPIC X, which serve to introduce a QUD into the discourse. The
idea takes its cue as far back as Jackendoff (1972), who says:
...the idea of the B-accented focus as topic accords with the intonation
of preposed (or “topicalized”) phrases, which almost always receive
a B accent. [...]
As for FREDB, I don’t think HEB can MAKEA it. (Jackendoff 1972:
p. 263)
5 Here I set aside the fact that deaccented VPs, in containing overt linguistic material, allow for a
greater range of INFERRED antecedents than elided VPs, e.g., John called Bill a Republican and
MARY insulted him TOO (Lakoff 1971).
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Roberts’ (1998/2012) QUD analysis, which formalized and extended Jackend-
off (1972), argues that B-accented Contrastive Topics (typically appearing with a
L+H* LH% prosodic contour) presuppose a strategy of inquiry with a superques-
tion/subquestion structure, which may need to be accommodated (see also Büring
(2003)). To see the point, first consider the pedestrian example of question-answer
congruence in (14), whereby the answer corresponding to the wh-term is focused
and hence accented.
(14) a. Mary: When are you going to China?
b. Sue: I’m going to China in APRIL.
Compare this case with (15):
(15) a. Mary: When are you going to China? (= Roberts ex. 47)
b. Sue: Well, I’m going to CHINAB in APRILA.
c. { QUD: When are you going to which place? }
d. Mary: Oh? Where else are you going, and when?
Sue’s decision to use contrastive topic marking on China in (15b) has the effect of
introducing an implicit superquestion with which it is congruent, as in (15c). This
generates an implicature that there are other places that Sue intends to visit, which is
likely to lead Mary to respond as in (15d).
This leads us to an analysis in which sentences containing phrases like In X’s case
function as question-answer pairs. Specifically, In X’s case introduces a QUD into
the discourse structure, created by focus-matching X against a corresponding entity
within the meaning of an anaphorically-identified, contextually-salient proposition.
The rest of the sentence answers (and hence is predicted to be intoned with respect
to) this QUD.
Let’s see how this works on (10), repeated below as (16).
(16) a. Every boy in Mrs. Smith’s class hoped she would pass him.
b. In John j’s case, I think she WILLF pass him j.
On this analysis, the phrase In John’s case triggers an anaphoric search for an
antecedent, provided here by the first clause. The contrastive topic John is focus-
matched against him, yielding a QUD containing polar and modal alternatives
Will/Did Mrs. Smith pass John?. The discourse semantics of passage (16) is hence
the same as that for (17):
(17) a. Every boy in Mrs. Smith’s class hoped she would pass him.
b. Will Mrs. Smith pass John?
QUD = { Mrs. Smith will pass John, Mrs. Smith will not pass John, ... }
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c. (Yes,) I think she WILLF pass him j.
The ellipsis clause displays focus on the auxiliary, as would be predicted by con-
gruence with this question. The interpretation is therefore entirely analogous to the
situation in which the QUD is explicitly mentioned in a preposed as-PP, rather than
anaphorically identified:
(18) As for whether she will pass John, I think she WILLF pass him j.
Thus, on this analysis, the interpretation under consideration is actually a STRICT
reading with the QUD evoked by In John’s case as the antecedent, rather than a
sloppy reading with the first clause as antecedent, as first appearances would suggest.
This analysis explains the difference between (16) and (12a). Specifically, Last
night at John’s party in (12a) is simply a run-of-the-mill adverbial; it is not anaphoric
nor does it receive a B-accent, and hence it does not introduce a QUD. Without
a QUD to serve as the antecedent, standard rules of focus marking and accent
placement will require accent on the pronoun, rendering the VP unable to be elided.
Hence, the fact that the VP can be deaccented when overt in (16) but not in (12a)
follows directly.
3.3 Additional evidence
This treatment makes a number of predictions that the data confirms. First, if In
X’s case evokes questions of the form of (17b), one would expect that it could be
felicitously followed by typical short answers to such questions. This appears to be
the case:6
(19) a. I think Mrs. Smith will pass most of the students in the class.
b. But in John’s case,

forget it.
no way.
no chance.
PUHLEEEASE!

These answers appear to directly respond to the question Will Mrs. Smith pass John?.
Second, the interpretations in question are available with a variety of other event
referential expressions that do not involve ellipsis:
(20) a. Every boy in Mrs. Smith’s class hoped she would pass him.
b. In John’s case,

I’m sure she’ll do it.
it’s inevitable.
I’m quite optimistic.

6 Interestingly, the simple answers yes and no seem awkward as follow-ons, for reasons that aren’t
entirely clear to me.
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These follow-ons all comment specifically on the question of whether Mrs. Smith will
pass John (i.e., and not all students), and hence their analysis is entirely analogous
to our treatment of (16). These data demonstrate that any analysis in which the
interpretation of (16) results specifically from a mechanism for reconstructing elided
material misses an important generalization.
Third, if events introduced by QUDs are made available for subsequent refer-
ence, entities so introduced should be available as possible referents to entity-level
anaphoric expressions such as pronouns as well. Consider (21–23):
(21) The only guy I can think of who comes close - and who seems finally on the
verge of a true breakout - is San Antonio’s George Hill (who we all know
had a mind-bogglingly great Summer League....not that Summer League
performances are a great indicator of anything....but in his case I think they
are).7 [= George Hill’s Summer League performances]
(22) We really don’t care what words the candidates choose to use as long as
they’re said truthfully...and in Obama’s case, they are.8 [= Obama’s words]
(23) The smears are only appropriate if they are true. In Obama’s case they are.9
[= smears on Obama]
The pronoun they in (22), for instance, doesn’t refer to all of the candidates’ words,
but specifically to Obama’s words — a referent that is not explicitly denoted by any
constituent in the context.
Lastly, one might recall that in the foregoing analysis, John gets focus-matched
against the referent of him in the first clause of (16) during the process of forming
the QUD. Despite the appearance that it is this pronoun that leads to the sloppy
reading (recall that on Hardt’s analysis this pronoun gets copied to the representation
of the ellipsis clause and re-resolved in that context), on our analysis the fact that a
pronoun was used is incidental. Consider (24–25):
(24) I think Mrs. Smith will pass most of the students in the class. In John’s case,
however, I don’t think she WILL pass him j.
(25) George and John are both worried about their grades. I’m almost certain that
Mrs. Smith will pass GEORGE. In John’s case, however, I don’t think she
WILL pass him j.
7 http://blog.oregonlive.com/behindblazersbeat/2009/07/live_blazers_chat_noon_monday.html
8 http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/firstread/archive/2008/02/03/634198.aspx
9 http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20081105131116AAMZXyT
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The elided clauses in (24) and (25) have the same “sloppy” interpretation as (10),
but crucially do not contain a pronoun in the antecedent clause.10 Examples (24)
and (25) receive the same analysis as (16), since the question of whether the focus-
matched constituent in the antecedent is pronominalized is irrelevant. All are strict
readings with the QUD as the antecedent. Again, naturally-occurring cases are
readily found:
(26) Congress and the Electoral officials are supposed to vet the candidates and
ensure that they are eligible to be President. In Obama’s case, they did not.11
[= vet Obama]
(27) Lauren, I never said that giving a convention speech is automatically going
to thrust someone into the national spotlight. However, in Obama’s case, I
think it did.12 [= thrust Obama into the national spotlight]
(28) They say that iron overload does not really impact your health until you’ve
had it for a long time but I think, in John’s case, it did.13 [= impact John’s
health]
In the case of (26), for example, the elided VP doesn’t refer to the concept of vetting
candidates in general, but specifically to vetting Obama. Again, this referent could
only arise through introduction of the QUD. Hence it seems reasonable to think that
any analysis that captures the facts for (16) should apply equally to (24–25) and
(26–28). The analysis proposed here does exactly that.
4 Inferring QUD antecedents
Consider where this puts us. If this story is on the right track, VP-ellipsis is acceptable
with a QUD as an antecedent, where (i) there is no syntactic identity, and (ii)
the denotation of the antecedent is not a property or a proposition, but a set of
propositions (assuming a Hamblin semantics). In light of this, a constraint requiring
membership in the alternative set denoted by the question seems like a natural one
to consider. But then what about the vast majority of other cases, for which there is
no explicit QUD?
10 Example (25) is reported to be marginal for some speakers, but even those speakers tend to find
it acceptable if contrastive topic intonation is used on George and John. This is what the analysis
predicts.
11 http://community.comcast.net/comcastportal/board/print?board.id=news&message.id=880023&page
=1&format=page
12 http://popculturedish.blogspot.com/2008_09_01_archive.html
13 http://theimmoralminority.blogspot.com/2009/03/lisa-demer-of-adn-must-not-have.html
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As is standard on the QUD model, in such cases QUDs will need to be inferred.
Here we take our cue from Roberts (1998/2002), who notes that prosody and
contextual clues feed the process of accommodating a QUD:
“Prosodic focus in English presupposes the type of question under
discussion, a presupposition which enables the hearer, with some
other contextually given clues, to reconstruct that question and its
relation to the strategy being pursued” (p. 8)
For the purpose of resolving VP-ellipsis, the contextual “clue” at work will be the
antecedent clause. For the task of QUD creation, I will use the focus-matching
constraint proposed by Rooth (1992), adapted only to generate a QUD that the
ellipsis clause answers rather than to license ellipsis directly:
For ellipsis clause CE and antecedent clause CA for which [[CA]]g ∈
||CE ||g, QUD = ||CE ||g
This simply says that the QUD is created by calculating focus alternatives of the
ellipsis clause under the constraint that the meaning of the antecedent clause be a
member of that set. Let us see how this works by stepping through a few examples.
Consider first the basic case of VP-ellipsis in (1), repeated below in (29), which is
characterized by subject focus:
(29) John read his paper, and Bill did too.
First suppose we have the candidate ellipsis clause in (30c).
(30) a. { Who read John’s paper? }
QUD = { { x read John’s paper } | x ∈ De }
b. John β1 read his1 paper, and ...
c. ...Bill did read John’s paper too.
Focus matching on Bill yields the alternative set associated with (30a). Since the
proposition denoted by the antecedent clause (30b) is a member of that set, ellipsis
is licensed, thereby resulting in the strict reading. Importantly, note that there is no
requirement for the antecedent and ellipsis clause VPs to be identical, as they aren’t
here. This reading is therefore derived without having to posit a referential-bound
ambiguity in the ellipsis clause or any special stipulations or machinery.
Alternatively, let’s say that we have the candidate ellipsis clause in (31c).
(31) a. { Who β3 read his3 paper? }
QUD = {{ x read x’s paper } | x ∈ De }
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b. John β1 read his1 paper, and...
c. ... Bill did β2 read his2 paper too.
Here, focus matching on the ellipsis clause yields the alternative set associated with
(31a). Since the antecedent clause (31b) is a member of that set, ellipsis is licensed,
thereby resulting in the sloppy reading. No other readings are possible under the
criterion that nothing can be focused in the VP to be elided, and hence focus-matched
against it.
Finally, we consider a case involving auxiliary focus:
(32) John was going to read his paper, and he DID.
(33) a. John was going to β1 read his1 paper...
QUD = {John read John’s paper, John didn’t read John’s paper, John
is/was going to read John’s paper, John is/was not going to read John’s
paper, ... }
b. and he DID β2 read his2 paper.
Here the accented auxiliary contrasts against was going to, creating a set of alterna-
tives that includes the modal and polar alternatives shown (along with others). Here
again the denotation of the antecedent clause is contained in that of the QUD, and
the constraint is met.
5 An unexpectedly unavailable sloppy reading
With that background, we are now ready to move on to our second example. Consider
a context in which a local school is looking for student volunteers, and Mary’s family
is talking about it. A canonical example of VP-ellipsis such as (34) clearly has the
expected strict and sloppy readings:
(34) Marym was going to sign herm son up for a volunteer slot, and herm SISTER
was TOO.
On analogy with our analysis of (29), the strict and sloppy readings are licensed per
(35) and (36) respectively:
(35) a. { Who was going to sign Mary’s son up for a volunteer slot? }
QUD= {{ x was going to sign Mary’s son up for a volunteer slot } | x ∈De }
b. Marym β1 was going to sign her1 son up for a volunteer slot,
c. and herm SISTER was going to sign Mary’s son up for a volunteer slot.
(36) a. { Who β3 was going to sign her3 son up for a volunteer slot? }
QUD = { { x was going to sign x’s son up for a volunteer slot } | x ∈ De }
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b. Marym β1 was going to sign her1 son up for a volunteer slot,
c. and herm SISTER was β2 going to sign her2 son up for a volunteer slot.
Now consider the variant in (37):
(37) Marym β1 was going to sign her1 son up for the last volunteer slot, but herm
SISTER already HAD.
Informants agree that (37) — crucially intoned without contrastive accent on sister
— only has the strict reading. That is, it can only mean that Mary’s sister signed up
Mary’s son, and not her own.
This is rather surprising. Standard analyses straightforwardly predict that the
sloppy reading should be possible, in light of the availability of a suitable antecedent
VP containing a bound pronoun:
(38) Marym β1 was going to sign her1 son up for the last volunteer slot, but herm
SISTER already HAD β2 signed her2 son up for the last volunteer slot.
There are several facts that point to the example’s information structural proper-
ties as being the reason for the missing reading. For one, it cannot be due to felicity
considerations. The example is constructed so that either reading is plausible —
Mary’s sister signing her own son up for the last available slot would be just as much
of an impediment to Mary’s plans as her sister signing Mary’s son up. (Indeed, if
anything, one would expect it to be more likely that someone would sign up her own
son instead of a relative’s.) Further, expressing the meaning corresponding to the
sloppy reading is perfectly coherent in the discourse setting, but doing so requires an
overt VP with accent on the pronoun:
(39) Marym β1 was going to sign her1 son up for the last volunteer slot, but her
SISTER β2 had already signed HER2 son up for the last volunteer slot.
The need for accent on the pronoun presumably renders the VP unable to be elided.
This leaves us with the question of why such accent would be necessary, especially
considering that the pronoun is bound.
Second, as the analysis predicts, the sloppy reading re-emerges for cases in
which accented auxiliaries participate in a contrastive topic structure:
(40) MARYm β1 WILL BE signing her1 son up for a volunteer slot, and herm
SISTER already HAS β2 signed her2 son up for a volunteer slot.
On analogy with examples like (36), the sloppy reading is licensed by a common
QUD such as Who β3 will/did sign her3 son up for a volunteer slot?. Such examples
show that the missing sloppy reading for (37) is not due specifically to the existence
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of a focused auxiliary (or, for that matter, the adverb already), but to the information
structural configuration in which the ellipsis clause participates.
So what is the correct analysis for (37)? The difference between (37) and (40)
seems to point to a need to distinguish the two types of accent on sister, which is
indicative of a difference between informational and contrastive focus.14 That is,
whereas sister in (37) requires accent, it is neither nuclear nor contrastive, and clearly
interacts differently with the surrounding discourse than the contrastive accent it
receives in (40). Following intuitions expressed by Kratzer (2004), I suggest that
only the contrastive focus on the auxiliary in (37) participates in the focus-matching
process (and hence the computation of alternatives), whereas the informational focus
on sister functions at a different level, specifically to distinguish foreground from
background. If the binder for the pronoun in the antecedent clause doesn’t participate
in focus-matching, there is no way to derive the sloppy reading.
Let’s see this proposal in action. Example (37) is interesting in that, despite the
fact that the first clause sets up an expectation that the QUD Will/Did Mary β1 sign
her1 son up for the last volunteer slot? will be answered (see the NON-ACTUALITY
IMPLICATURES of Grant et al. (2012)), the second clause does not provide an answer
directly. Instead, it implicates that the answer is no (or at least, not yes) by providing
a REASON for this answer. These ruminations lead to me an analysis in which (37)
is characterized by a strategy of inquiry of the sort shown in (41).
(41) a. Marym β1 was to sign her1 son up for the last volunteer slot,
b. { Will/Did Mary β1 sign her1 son up for the last volunteer slot? }
c. but (= No!)
d. { Why not? }
e. { Will/Did someone sign Mary’s son up for the last volunteer slot? }
f. ...herm SISTER already HAD signed Mary’s son up for the last volunteer
slot.
Per the discussion above, the primary accent on the auxiliary takes part in focus
matching to yield a QUD containing modal/polar alternatives as in (41b) which,
again, also happens to be the QUD served up by the antecedent clause. As it stands,
the denotation of the ellipsis clause is not in the QUD’s alternative set, violating
Rooth’s (and therefore, my) constraint on elidability. At this point, the informational
accent on sister triggers the inference to a generalization of the QUD, yielding (41d),
the denotation of which the meaning of the ellipsis clause is now a member. At this
14 This of course steps into a long and controversial debate about whether such a distinction exists, the
arguments for which I will not address here. See for instance Selkirk (2008) and citations therein for
discussion.
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point, inference takes over to establish the relationship between the first QUD and
the newly accommodated one — i.e., that Mary didn’t sign Mary’s son up because
someone else had signed Mary’s son up. At the end of the day, the constraints on
ellipsis are satisfied, but only when what’s at issue is whether anyone has signed up
Mary’s son. The question of whether anyone else signed up their own son doesn’t
come into play.
Admittedly, this analysis helps itself to some degrees of freedom allowed by the
QUD framework, and hence it has to remain tentative. With that caveat having been
stipulated, insofar as the analysis is right, it provides a potential explanation for an
otherwise mysterious pattern noted for sluicing by Merchant (2001: 8). Merchant
notes that sluicing appears to not generally allow sloppy readings (42a), despite the
fact that one of Ross’s (1969) original examples appears to permit it (42b).
(42) a. Abby said she’d stop smoking, but BETH wouldn’t say WHEN. [strict]
(adapted from Merchant’s ex. (i)a)
b. Bob knows how to crane his neck, but I don’t know how. [strict/sloppy]
c. ABBY said she’d stop smoking TOMORROW, but BETH wouldn’t SAY
when. [strict/sloppy]
The reason for the discrepancy between (42a) and (42b) is now evident. Whereas
in (42a) the wh-term is focused in the sluiced clause (with Beth carrying only
informational focus), in (42b) the subject I is focused. On a QUD-based analysis
of sluicing (Ginzburg & Sag 2000; Ginzburg 2012; AnderBois 2014), only in (42b)
do both clauses provide partial answers to a QUD that includes bound variable
alternatives (Who β1 knows how to crane his1 neck?). In (42a), if Beth doesn’t
participate in focus matching on analogy with our treatment of (37), no sloppy
reading results. On the other hand, I find (42c), a variant of (42a) with subject focus,
to have a sloppy reading with the accent placed as indicated. In this case a QUD that
licenses the sloppy reading is available:
(43) a. { When did who β3 say she3 would stop smoking? }
b. ABBY β1 said she1’d stop smoking TOMORROW,
c. but BETH β2 wouldn’t SAY when she2 would stop smoking.
The effect of information structure is particularly clear if we consider the following
minimal pair:15
(44) a. Bob can crane his neck, but I don’t know HOW. [strict]
b. Bob can crane his neck, but I don’t know how. [strict/sloppy]
15 Thanks to Gwen Gillingham for suggesting these examples.
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Examples (44a-b) differ only with respect to their focus marking. Passage (44a),
which has auxiliary focus, only has a strict reading, whereas passage (44b), which
has subject focus, has both strict and sloppy readings. Both facts are as predicted.
6 Remaining problems
The analysis presented here explains the readings for classic examples of VP-ellipsis
without appeal to specialized principles or machinery, as well as certain cases that
are problematic for previous accounts. The analysis is not without its own problems,
however, which render the project a work-in-progress. I focus on three issues here.
First, recall that the analysis borrows heavily from the focus-matching procedure
of Rooth (1992), used here to generate the QUDs that ellipsis clauses answer. Rooth
argues that the semantic redundancy criterion associated with the procedure is a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for felicitous elision. As evidence for its
insufficiency, he offers examples (45a-b), in which the antecedent clauses have
coreferring elements but no possibility of binding.
(45) a. 5 is less than or equal to 5, and 7 is β1 less than or equal to itself1 too.
b. # 5 is less than or equal to 5, and 7 is β1 less than or equal to itself1 too.
(= Rooth’s exs. 5b and 6)
The first clause in (45a) licenses the deaccenting of the VP in the second clause,
since the first clause expresses a proposition according to which a number is less than
or equal to itself. The elision of this VP is not licensed on the sloppy interpretation
per (45b) however; here only the (factually incorrect) strict reading is available.
The lack of a sloppy reading is clearly due to the fact that the antecedent clause
does not contain a pronoun. The analysis I have offered, in its utilization of Rooth’s
mechanism, nonetheless predicts it to be acceptable, since the focus alternative set
for the ellipsis clause will contain all of the propositions whereby a number is less
than or equal to itself, and the antecedent clause denotes a member of that set. This is
a significant weakness: The existence of an anaphorically-dependent element in the
antecedent clause is central to the licensing of sloppy readings, yet there is nothing
in my analysis that cares about what referring expressions are used.
This issue caused Rooth to posit a second constraint, one calling for syntactic
identity between the antecedent and ellipsis clause VPs. Such a constraint is hard to
reconcile with examples like (16), however, in which there is clearly no syntactic
parallelism between the ellipsis clause and the QUD-denoting antecedent In John’s
case. The same is true for a wide variety of other well-known cases involving
syntactic mismatch that by now are well-discussed in the literature, including voice
mismatches, nominalized antecedents, and so forth. Reconciliation of the relevant
data points remains a subject for future work.
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A second set of issues is brought to the fore by Weir (2014). Weir posits a
QUD-based theory of fragment ellipsis along the same lines as what is proposed
here for VP-ellipsis. Adapting an example due to Jacobson (2013), he points out that
fragment answers and VP-ellipsis appear to operate under different constraints:
(46) Which math professor left the party at midnight?
a. Well, Jill left the party at midnight, but I don’t think she’s a math professor.
b. # Well, Jill left the party at midnight, but I don’t think she’s a math profes-
sor.
c. Well, Jill did left the party at midnight, but I don’t think she’s a math
professor.
Answer (46a), which does not involve ellipsis, is perfectly felicitous, whereas the
fragment ellipsis in (46b) is not. Weir’s explanation is that because fragment ellipsis
is constrained to provide an answer to the operative QUD, the proposition denoted by
Jill left the party at midnight has to be in the alternative set denoted by the question.
This in turn commits the speaker to believing that Jill is a member of the set of math
professors, hence the oddity of the follow-on. Note that the VP-ellipsis in example
(46c) is fine, however. If VP-ellipsis is similarly restricted as the current analysis
would suggest, then the question is why (46c) doesn’t express the same type of
contradiction that (46b) does. As Weir himself notes, the support for his analysis
and that for QUD-based analyses of VP-ellipsis remains to be reconciled.
A third (and related) set of issues regards the relationship between VP-ellipsis
and event referential forms that do not involve ellipsis, such as do it anaphora.
A central facet of Miller & Pullum’s (2014) treatment of exophorically-resolved
VP-ellipsis and Miller & Hemforth’s (2015) treatment of examples with nominalized
antecedents is that VP-ellipsis is sensitive to alternatives in a way that do it is not.
Now it is of course well-known that do it anaphora gives rise to strict and sloppy
ambiguities much as VP-ellipsis does:
(47) John read his paper, and Bill did it too.
And from what I can tell, the examples I have focused on in this paper do not draw the
kind of thick line in the sand between the two forms that one might expect in light of
the observations of Miller and colleagues. For one, recall that we noted in Section 3
that QUDs denoted by phrases like In X’s case make interpretations available for
event-referential forms that seem to parallel those for VP-ellipsis (see example 20).
Further, example (48), a modified version of (37) that employs do it instead of
VP-ellipsis (crucially with the same informational focus on sister), according to my
judgments has only the same strict reading as its VP-ellipsis counterpart:
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(48) Marym β1 was going to sign her1 son up for the last volunteer slot, but herm
SISTER had already DONE it.
This pattern weakens any claim that the relevant facts result from a dependence
on QUDs that is specific to VP-ellipsis. Again, future work is required to sort out
the commonalities and differences among competing forms of ellipsis and event
reference and the respects to which they may be sensitive to QUDs.
7 Conclusions
This paper has pursued an analysis in which the primary constraint for felicitous
VP-ellipsis is that the ellipsis clause provide an answer to the current QUD. This
alleviates the need to rely on an untenable bound-referential ambiguity in antecedent
clauses or specialized constraints or machinery. On this analysis, the relationship
between the antecedent and ellipsis clauses is indirect: Whereas no constraint
(identity or otherwise) applies directly to them, the antecedent and ellipsis clauses
do often conspire to determine the QUD that is being answered.
This analysis yields a different explanation for Hardt’s (16) than is found else-
where in the literature. Whereas such examples are important and revealing, they
do not provide support for his free-interpretation analysis. The mystery surround-
ing such examples is why the VP can be deaccented (and ultimately elided) when
standard rules for focus marking and accent placement would normally require such
VPs to carry accent, as we saw for (12). The QUD story provides an answer, in that
it is the QUD denoted by In John’s case, and not the first sentence, that serves as the
antecedent for the ellipsis.
Further, the lack of sloppy readings with certain examples featuring auxiliary
focus like (37) is mysterious and not predicted by any analysis of which I am aware.
Although the analysis offered here remains tentative, the QUD-based constraint
offers a potential explanation for why the reading would be missing when the
requisite bound variable VP and parallelism between antecedent and ellipsis clauses
are present. The analysis extends to a pattern for sluicing that to my knowledge has
heretofore gone unaddressed.
Importantly, the evidence that VP-ellipsis is sensitive to QUDs goes well beyond
the types of cases discussed here. As mentioned in the introduction, a number of
authors have discussed phenomena that point to a role for QUDs, and the arguments
made here find a natural home among them. Having said that, our understanding
of QUD analyses is still in a relative state of infancy, allowing for many degrees
of freedom, and differences among the behavior of different forms of ellipsis and
event reference have emerged. As such, much work still needs to be done to have
a more complete understanding of QUD analyses of discourse coherence and their
relationship to VP-ellipsis and other forms of linguistic reduction in natural language.
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